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2012年台湾大选结果是马英九胜选，蓝营与台湾商界为之欢欣，北京与美国也终于松了一口气。
这次马英九得6872524票，占51.6%，蔡英文得6083443，占45.7%，双方相差约6个百分点。这当然不是蔡英文魅力不够。平心而论，绿营任谁出马，都不可能获得比她好的结果。在陈水扁因腐败入狱，民进党被严重污名化、欲振乏力之际，唯有形象清新的蔡英文披上征袍参选，才会让蓝营与北京倾力以对。选举结果彰示出来的真问题是：台湾离美国太远，离北京太近。这一结论已由来自于8个国家，21位观选员组成的“台湾公正选举国际委员会”的评议结果证明。该委员会说，台湾这次总统和立委选举，台湾民众大致展现了自由的投票意志，但是在选战的过程当中，仍然有不公正的地方，尤其是过去威权统治的影响以及外国的干预这两个问题。
来自威权统治影响之一是针对竞选经费，政党之间的党产和资源差距极大，在竞选花费上的开支管控问题不太受到关注，使得选举法规经常不被遵守，屡遭破坏，选举的公平性因而被削弱。
所谓“外国干预”，则是因2012年台湾选举，是在中国对台政治经济势力渗透不断增强的背景下，台湾选民承受巨大压力进行的。马英九在选举中打的两张牌一是经济牌（台湾对中国大陆的经济依存度居世界之首），二是与大陆关系牌。台湾岛内人群受此影响的人有近半数，还有大陆能够直接施加影响的50多万台商及近10万大陆新娘。在选前，曾有民调显示，马蔡二人的支持率只相差三个点，这三个点通常是在误差之内。但我仔细看了调查范围之后，知道事情没这么简单，因为这项调查有两个庞大的人群并未列入其内，即50多万在大陆投资的台商群体，以及获得投票权的大陆新娘近10万人。对这两个群体来说，大陆都是其地位的依凭与保障。据说此次14万人即一个百分点的差距，这些人及其能够影响的家属有200多万，对于台湾选情足以能够形成举足轻重的影响——若干年前，一位深谙台湾政情社会的文化人曾对我说过，台湾地方小，有时候一个小因素就可以使整个局面翻盘。
这次选举中，大陆施加的影响的手段较以前柔性，即更有策略。由于以前北京介入台湾选情太过直接，除了采用本次相同的手法之外，还施以口头及武力威胁。比如在当年陈水扁竞选连任时，称如果陈当选，大陆将如何如何之类，结果激发了台湾民众反感，反而使选情逆转。这次北京政府的手法相对温和，不再采用武力威胁，而是利用人的趋利避害天性，对马英九软性相助，为其“经济牌”与“两岸关系牌”加分。至于少数大陆人也注意到的让台商回台投票机票优惠、船票免费等，其实都是小意思，与其说台商是为此小利所动，还不如说是从这些小利中看到北京的意向：你们赶快回乡投票支持马英九当选。在如此强烈的信号下，台商哪敢不从？
美中两国对台湾大选结果表示满意，是意料中事。前美国在台协会驻台办事处长包道格（Douglas H. Paal ）在投票日前夕，对台湾媒体表示美中两国都偏好马英九连任。且不谈这一说话是否适当，以及是否对选情造成影响，但这说法应该是中美两国的真实态度。北京满意这一结果，是因为祖国统一已经构成其重要的统治合法性基础，而台湾两岸联系日趋紧密，更是中共多年经营的结果。美国满意，则是因为在已经日趋紧张的中美关系及南海问题上，不宜再增更多变数。在“国际关系”互动中，双方出牌都需要谨慎。2011年11月亚太峰会以来美国看似高调，但只要仔细观察，就会发现美国重返太平洋后的同盟者，少了台湾这个成员。这种考虑是双重的，一是经济上的，比如TPP协议不邀请台湾加入，是因为担心Made in China变身为Made in Taiwan，并非TPP成员国的中国产品借助台湾进入其它协议各国。中国以前在纺织品配额受限时就曾有过类似把戏。二是军事上的，眼下日本南韩等在南海布局，比如日本加强西边防务，就是以台湾不再是同盟为前提考虑。
大陆对台湾的红色渗透有多厉害？关于媒体方面，我以前写过“红色资本渗透与台湾媒体的‘选边靠岸’”一文详细介绍情况。学术文化界的互动往还也相当密切，台湾军界的退休将领更是成为北京重要“统战对象”。自从国军前参谋总长郝柏村十多年前返乡之后，不少退役将领都接受大陆盛情邀请访问大陆。这种从政治到经济、文化以及军界的全面来往与利益牵绊，对台湾确实有“温水煮青蛙”效应，使他们对大陆的专制政治那种极强的腐蚀力丧失警惕之心。“红色渗透”对台湾民主政治可能产生的影响，已有袁红冰《台湾大劫难》一书详加分析。我去年5月到台湾，与蓝、绿、军界及知识界人士都有接触，倾听了各种意见。概言之，对于大陆，台湾人的感情复杂：既无法拒绝目前的利益羁绊，又担心久而久之台湾丧失目前这来之不易的民主。对于台海关系，他们一厢情愿地希望能够长期保持现状，即经济上密切合作，政治上保持一定距离。这一思维与东南亚国家前几年的“经济依靠中国龙，安全依靠美国鹰”并无二致。
在与这些台湾人士的谈话中，我始终坚持一个观点：香港大陆化，我同情，因为他们没有制度做为凭藉反抗大陆的红色渗透；但 台湾如果大陆化，得怨你们自己愿做“温水中的青蛙”，因为你们有民主制度作为反抗大陆化的制度凭藉。近年来部分追求民主的大陆人之所以特别重视台湾，一个主要因素是因为台湾民主政治的建立，打破了华人素质不适宜民主的假设，希望在台湾的示范效下，大陆人民能够走上反抗专制建立民主政治之路。
2012年选举中，还有值得一提的事情，那就是中国民众对台湾民进党态度的变化。与前几年不同，中国大陆人不再是“闻绿则骂”，希望蔡英文当选的人不在少数。通过在微博上交谈观察，我发现这种变化并非因为他们了解台湾政情，了解马英九的国民党。他们态度的变化其实基于以下逆反心理：共产党反对谁，一定是这个人不利于中共专制统治，那我们就支持这个人。
The complex implications of Taiwan general election 2012
By He Qinglian on January 18, 2012
Translated by kRiZcPEc
http://hqlenglish.blogspot.com/2012/01/taiwan-election-2012.html
Ma Ying-jeou won in 2012 Taiwan general election, a result that the Blue camp and the business sector of the Island cheered for, and China and the United States felt relieved with.
This time, Ma Ying-jeou got 6,872,524 votes, making up 51.6% of the ballots; Tsai Ing-wen got 6,083,443 votes, or 45.7%; the two sides differed by about six percentage points. This surely wasn’t a result of Tsai not having enough charisma. To be fair, no other person from the Green camp could have done a better job than she did. After Chen Shui-bian imprisoned for corruption, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), with its reputation severely tarnished, didn’t quite have the strength to restart. At such a time, Tsai Ing-wen was the only opponent who, with her clean image, would make the Blue camp and Beijing pull out every stop to secure victory in the election. The real issue reflected by the election result is: Taiwan is too far away from the United States and too close to China. This conclusion is backed by the evaluation result from the International Committee for Fair Elections in Taiwan, which comprised twenty-one observers from eight countries. The Committee said that in this round of presidential and legislative elections, the public of Taiwan has by and large exhibited the free will in casting their votes. But during the election campaign there was still unfairness, in particular these two issues: influence of past authoritarian rule and foreign intervention.
One of the influence of past authoritarian rule referred to campaign funds. There has been a huge gap between what different political parties have in their assets and resources; little attention has been paid to the issue of election spending control, which gave rise to frequent non-observation and repeated breaking of election rules, resulting in election fairness being undermined.
The so-called “foreign intervention” referred to the 2012 election that was carried out with the Taiwanese voters under immense pressure, against the backdrop of the ever strengthening infiltration in Taiwan’s politics and economy from China. In the election, Ma played two cards, one was economy—Taiwan tops the world in economic dependence on mainland China—and the other being relations with mainland China. Nearly half of the Island’s population was influenced by these, and then there are over half a million Taiwanese businesspeople and nearly 100,000 mainland brides on whom the mainland authorities could exert direct influence. Before the election, an opinion poll showed that between the support ratio of Ma and Tsai there was a gap of only three-percentage point, which usually are within the error. But after I looked closely at the scope of the poll, I realized the thing was not so simple. In this poll two sizable groups of people were left out: the 500,000-plus Taiwanese businesspeople with investment in mainland China and the nearly 100,000 mainland brides. For these two groups of people, mainland China is what they rely on for protection of their status. Reportedly this time 140,000 persons made up a difference of one percentage point, these people, and the families under their influence, numbered more than two million, large enough to produce a significant impact on Taiwan election outcome. Several years back, an intellectual with a deep understanding of Taiwan’s politics and society once said to me, Taiwan is a small place, sometimes a trivial factor could overturn the entire situation.
In this election, mainland China exerted its influence with means that were softer than before, or with a better strategy. Because in the past Beijing intervened too directly in Taiwan’s election—apart from methods there were used in this election, it also resorted to verbal and military threats. For example, when Chen Shui-bian ran for re-election, Beijing vowed it would do so and so if Chen won, that resulted in stirring up resentment in the Taiwanese people and reversed the election outcome. This time the Beijing government was more subtle in its approach and ceased using military threat; instead, it made use of the human nature of seeking gains and avoiding losses and offered subtle assistance to Ma’s campaign, giving extra points to his cards of economy and “cross-strait relations”. And as some mainland Chinese might have noticed, the Chinese authorities provided Taiwan businesspeople with air ticket concession or free ship tickets for them to go back to Taiwan to vote, these were just some unimportant things really. Rather than saying the Taiwanese businesspeople were moved by these gestures, it would be more accurate to say that they could gauge the intention of Beijing behind all this: go home, vote, and help Ma Ying-jeou get re-elected. With such a strong signal, how would those Taiwanese businesspeople dare not comply?
There is no surprise that the United States and China felt satisfied with the election result. Former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, Douglas H. Paal, told Taiwan media on the eve of the polling day that both the United States and China prefer to see Ma re-elected. Let’s not discuss whether that statement was appropriate, or if that had any impact on the election outcome, that saying should probably have reflected the real attitude of China and the United States. Beijing was pleased with the result because reunification with Taiwan has become the crucial basis of its ruling legitimacy. More importantly, the closer ties across the Taiwan Straits are the result of hard efforts CPC has made for years. The United States felt happy with the result because, as the China-US relations became increasingly strained and the South China Sea disputes escalated, it would rather not see another variable. In their interaction under the scope of “international relations”, both sides need to play their cards with caution. The United States seems to be high-profile since the APEC summit in November 2011, but look closely and you would notice that Taiwan was not one of the US allies as the country returned to the Pacific. That was a twofold consideration. One being economic reasons: for instance, it did not include Taiwan as a TPP member as there were worries that goods made in China would be labeled as “made in Taiwan”. In so doing, China, a non-member of the TPP agreement, could sell its products to other TPP member states with the help of Taiwan. China had played a similar trick before, when its textile export quota was limited. And the other was military: right now in South China Sea, Japan and South Korea are shaping their military layout. For example, Japan’s stepping up the defense of its west was an action with the premise that Taiwan was no longer its ally.
To what extent has mainland China infiltrated in Taiwan? Regarding media, I wrote an article before, “The Penetration of Red Capitals and ‘side-choosing’ of Taiwan’s media”, describing in detail the situation. And there have been close interactions in academic and cultural sectors of both sides; retired officers of Taiwan military have, in particular, become important targets of Beijing’s “united front”. After Hau Pei-tsun, former Minister of National Defense ROC, visited his ancestral village ten-odd years ago, mainland China had sent out visit invitations heartily to many retired generals of Taiwan. This interaction on all front, from political, economic, to cultural and military sectors, does indeed have the effect of “boiling frogs”, numbing the Taiwanese vigilance against the powerful force of erosion that the authoritarian politics of mainland China has. Regarding the impacts “Red Penetration” might have on Taiwan’s democratic politics, Yuan Hongbing had made detailed analysis in his book Taiwan Disaster. In May last year I went to Taiwan, met with people from the Blue Camp, the Green Camp, Military and intellectuals, and listened to various viewpoints. In sum, when it comes to mainland China, the Taiwanese people are with mixed feelings: they could not reject the fetter of interests at present, and yet they are worried that over time Taiwan would lose its hard-won democracy. Regarding cross-strait relations, they wishfully hope that the status quo could be maintained in the long run—to work closely with mainland China on economy, and keep a distance in politics. This thinking is no difference from the mindset of “Relying on the Chinese dragon for economy, and counting on the American eagle for security” of Southeast Asian countries a few years back.
When in conversation with these Taiwanese, I always had this opinion: I sympathize with Hong Kong in its becoming more like mainland China, because the people there have nothing to rely on in resisting red penetration from the mainland; but if Taiwan ends up that way, then you could only blame yourselves for willingly become “boiling frogs”; you have a democratic system to rely on in resisting “mainlandization”. In recent years, some of those pursuing democracy in mainland China have been paying special attention to Taiwan, one of the key reasons for this was: with the establishment of democratic politics in the Island, the assumption that the quality of Chinese people are unfit for democracy was broken. They hoped that with the model of Taiwan, people in mainland China could get on the path of fighting against autocracy and establishing democratic politics.
In the 2012 election there is another thing worth mentioning: the change of attitude the Chinese people have toward the DPP. Contrary to how things were a few years back, the Chinese people have stopped lashing out whenever they hear the Green camp, quite a few wished that Tsai could win the election. Through observation and chatting on Weibo, I found that this change was not due to their understanding of Taiwan’s politics or of Kuomintang under Ma. This change of attitude was in fact a result of the following antagonistic mentality: the Communist Party opposes a candidate must be because that person is not conducive to its authoritarian rule, then that person has our support.
2012年台湾大选结果是马英九胜选，蓝营与台湾商界为之欢欣，北京与美国也终于松了一口气。
这次马英九得6872524票，占51.6%，蔡英文得6083443，占45.7%，双方相差约6个百分点。这当然不是蔡英文魅力不够。平心而论，绿营任谁出马，都不可能获得比她好的结果。在陈水扁因腐败入狱，民进党被严重污名化、欲振乏力之际，唯有形象清新的蔡英文披上征袍参选，才会让蓝营与北京倾力以对。选举结果彰示出来的真问题是：台湾离美国太远，离北京太近。这一结论已由来自于8个国家，21位观选员组成的“台湾公正选举国际委员会”的评议结果证明。该委员会说，台湾这次总统和立委选举，台湾民众大致展现了自由的投票意志，但是在选战的过程当中，仍然有不公正的地方，尤其是过去威权统治的影响以及外国的干预这两个问题。
来自威权统治影响之一是针对竞选经费，政党之间的党产和资源差距极大，在竞选花费上的开支管控问题不太受到关注，使得选举法规经常不被遵守，屡遭破坏，选举的公平性因而被削弱。
所谓“外国干预”，则是因2012年台湾选举，是在中国对台政治经济势力渗透不断增强的背景下，台湾选民承受巨大压力进行的。马英九在选举中打的两张牌一是经济牌（台湾对中国大陆的经济依存度居世界之首），二是与大陆关系牌。台湾岛内人群受此影响的人有近半数，还有大陆能够直接施加影响的50多万台商及近10万大陆新娘。在选前，曾有民调显示，马蔡二人的支持率只相差三个点，这三个点通常是在误差之内。但我仔细看了调查范围之后，知道事情没这么简单，因为这项调查有两个庞大的人群并未列入其内，即50多万在大陆投资的台商群体，以及获得投票权的大陆新娘近10万人。对这两个群体来说，大陆都是其地位的依凭与保障。据说此次14万人即一个百分点的差距，这些人及其能够影响的家属有200多万，对于台湾选情足以能够形成举足轻重的影响——若干年前，一位深谙台湾政情社会的文化人曾对我说过，台湾地方小，有时候一个小因素就可以使整个局面翻盘。
这次选举中，大陆施加的影响的手段较以前柔性，即更有策略。由于以前北京介入台湾选情太过直接，除了采用本次相同的手法之外，还施以口头及武力威胁。比如在当年陈水扁竞选连任时，称如果陈当选，大陆将如何如何之类，结果激发了台湾民众反感，反而使选情逆转。这次北京政府的手法相对温和，不再采用武力威胁，而是利用人的趋利避害天性，对马英九软性相助，为其“经济牌”与“两岸关系牌”加分。至于少数大陆人也注意到的让台商回台投票机票优惠、船票免费等，其实都是小意思，与其说台商是为此小利所动，还不如说是从这些小利中看到北京的意向：你们赶快回乡投票支持马英九当选。在如此强烈的信号下，台商哪敢不从？
美中两国对台湾大选结果表示满意，是意料中事。前美国在台协会驻台办事处长包道格（Douglas H. Paal ）在投票日前夕，对台湾媒体表示美中两国都偏好马英九连任。且不谈这一说话是否适当，以及是否对选情造成影响，但这说法应该是中美两国的真实态度。北京满意这一结果，是因为祖国统一已经构成其重要的统治合法性基础，而台湾两岸联系日趋紧密，更是中共多年经营的结果。美国满意，则是因为在已经日趋紧张的中美关系及南海问题上，不宜再增更多变数。在“国际关系”互动中，双方出牌都需要谨慎。2011年11月亚太峰会以来美国看似高调，但只要仔细观察，就会发现美国重返太平洋后的同盟者，少了台湾这个成员。这种考虑是双重的，一是经济上的，比如TPP协议不邀请台湾加入，是因为担心Made in China变身为Made in Taiwan，并非TPP成员国的中国产品借助台湾进入其它协议各国。中国以前在纺织品配额受限时就曾有过类似把戏。二是军事上的，眼下日本南韩等在南海布局，比如日本加强西边防务，就是以台湾不再是同盟为前提考虑。
大陆对台湾的红色渗透有多厉害？关于媒体方面，我以前写过“红色资本渗透与台湾媒体的‘选边靠岸’”一文详细介绍情况。学术文化界的互动往还也相当密切，台湾军界的退休将领更是成为北京重要“统战对象”。自从国军前参谋总长郝柏村十多年前返乡之后，不少退役将领都接受大陆盛情邀请访问大陆。这种从政治到经济、文化以及军界的全面来往与利益牵绊，对台湾确实有“温水煮青蛙”效应，使他们对大陆的专制政治那种极强的腐蚀力丧失警惕之心。“红色渗透”对台湾民主政治可能产生的影响，已有袁红冰《台湾大劫难》一书详加分析。我去年5月到台湾，与蓝、绿、军界及知识界人士都有接触，倾听了各种意见。概言之，对于大陆，台湾人的感情复杂：既无法拒绝目前的利益羁绊，又担心久而久之台湾丧失目前这来之不易的民主。对于台海关系，他们一厢情愿地希望能够长期保持现状，即经济上密切合作，政治上保持一定距离。这一思维与东南亚国家前几年的“经济依靠中国龙，安全依靠美国鹰”并无二致。
在与这些台湾人士的谈话中，我始终坚持一个观点：香港大陆化，我同情，因为他们没有制度做为凭藉反抗大陆的红色渗透；但 台湾如果大陆化，得怨你们自己愿做“温水中的青蛙”，因为你们有民主制度作为反抗大陆化的制度凭藉。近年来部分追求民主的大陆人之所以特别重视台湾，一个主要因素是因为台湾民主政治的建立，打破了华人素质不适宜民主的假设，希望在台湾的示范效下，大陆人民能够走上反抗专制建立民主政治之路。
2012年选举中，还有值得一提的事情，那就是中国民众对台湾民进党态度的变化。与前几年不同，中国大陆人不再是“闻绿则骂”，希望蔡英文当选的人不在少数。通过在微博上交谈观察，我发现这种变化并非因为他们了解台湾政情，了解马英九的国民党。他们态度的变化其实基于以下逆反心理：共产党反对谁，一定是这个人不利于中共专制统治，那我们就支持这个人。
The complex implications of Taiwan general election 2012
By He Qinglian on January 18, 2012
Translated by kRiZcPEc
http://hqlenglish.blogspot.com/2012/01/taiwan-election-2012.html
Ma Ying-jeou won in 2012 Taiwan general election, a result that the Blue camp and the business sector of the Island cheered for, and China and the United States felt relieved with.
This time, Ma Ying-jeou got 6,872,524 votes, making up 51.6% of the ballots; Tsai Ing-wen got 6,083,443 votes, or 45.7%; the two sides differed by about six percentage points. This surely wasn’t a result of Tsai not having enough charisma. To be fair, no other person from the Green camp could have done a better job than she did. After Chen Shui-bian imprisoned for corruption, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), with its reputation severely tarnished, didn’t quite have the strength to restart. At such a time, Tsai Ing-wen was the only opponent who, with her clean image, would make the Blue camp and Beijing pull out every stop to secure victory in the election. The real issue reflected by the election result is: Taiwan is too far away from the United States and too close to China. This conclusion is backed by the evaluation result from the International Committee for Fair Elections in Taiwan, which comprised twenty-one observers from eight countries. The Committee said that in this round of presidential and legislative elections, the public of Taiwan has by and large exhibited the free will in casting their votes. But during the election campaign there was still unfairness, in particular these two issues: influence of past authoritarian rule and foreign intervention.
One of the influence of past authoritarian rule referred to campaign funds. There has been a huge gap between what different political parties have in their assets and resources; little attention has been paid to the issue of election spending control, which gave rise to frequent non-observation and repeated breaking of election rules, resulting in election fairness being undermined.
The so-called “foreign intervention” referred to the 2012 election that was carried out with the Taiwanese voters under immense pressure, against the backdrop of the ever strengthening infiltration in Taiwan’s politics and economy from China. In the election, Ma played two cards, one was economy—Taiwan tops the world in economic dependence on mainland China—and the other being relations with mainland China. Nearly half of the Island’s population was influenced by these, and then there are over half a million Taiwanese businesspeople and nearly 100,000 mainland brides on whom the mainland authorities could exert direct influence. Before the election, an opinion poll showed that between the support ratio of Ma and Tsai there was a gap of only three-percentage point, which usually are within the error. But after I looked closely at the scope of the poll, I realized the thing was not so simple. In this poll two sizable groups of people were left out: the 500,000-plus Taiwanese businesspeople with investment in mainland China and the nearly 100,000 mainland brides. For these two groups of people, mainland China is what they rely on for protection of their status. Reportedly this time 140,000 persons made up a difference of one percentage point, these people, and the families under their influence, numbered more than two million, large enough to produce a significant impact on Taiwan election outcome. Several years back, an intellectual with a deep understanding of Taiwan’s politics and society once said to me, Taiwan is a small place, sometimes a trivial factor could overturn the entire situation.
In this election, mainland China exerted its influence with means that were softer than before, or with a better strategy. Because in the past Beijing intervened too directly in Taiwan’s election—apart from methods there were used in this election, it also resorted to verbal and military threats. For example, when Chen Shui-bian ran for re-election, Beijing vowed it would do so and so if Chen won, that resulted in stirring up resentment in the Taiwanese people and reversed the election outcome. This time the Beijing government was more subtle in its approach and ceased using military threat; instead, it made use of the human nature of seeking gains and avoiding losses and offered subtle assistance to Ma’s campaign, giving extra points to his cards of economy and “cross-strait relations”. And as some mainland Chinese might have noticed, the Chinese authorities provided Taiwan businesspeople with air ticket concession or free ship tickets for them to go back to Taiwan to vote, these were just some unimportant things really. Rather than saying the Taiwanese businesspeople were moved by these gestures, it would be more accurate to say that they could gauge the intention of Beijing behind all this: go home, vote, and help Ma Ying-jeou get re-elected. With such a strong signal, how would those Taiwanese businesspeople dare not comply?
There is no surprise that the United States and China felt satisfied with the election result. Former director of the American Institute in Taiwan, Douglas H. Paal, told Taiwan media on the eve of the polling day that both the United States and China prefer to see Ma re-elected. Let’s not discuss whether that statement was appropriate, or if that had any impact on the election outcome, that saying should probably have reflected the real attitude of China and the United States. Beijing was pleased with the result because reunification with Taiwan has become the crucial basis of its ruling legitimacy. More importantly, the closer ties across the Taiwan Straits are the result of hard efforts CPC has made for years. The United States felt happy with the result because, as the China-US relations became increasingly strained and the South China Sea disputes escalated, it would rather not see another variable. In their interaction under the scope of “international relations”, both sides need to play their cards with caution. The United States seems to be high-profile since the APEC summit in November 2011, but look closely and you would notice that Taiwan was not one of the US allies as the country returned to the Pacific. That was a twofold consideration. One being economic reasons: for instance, it did not include Taiwan as a TPP member as there were worries that goods made in China would be labeled as “made in Taiwan”. In so doing, China, a non-member of the TPP agreement, could sell its products to other TPP member states with the help of Taiwan. China had played a similar trick before, when its textile export quota was limited. And the other was military: right now in South China Sea, Japan and South Korea are shaping their military layout. For example, Japan’s stepping up the defense of its west was an action with the premise that Taiwan was no longer its ally.
To what extent has mainland China infiltrated in Taiwan? Regarding media, I wrote an article before, “The Penetration of Red Capitals and ‘side-choosing’ of Taiwan’s media”, describing in detail the situation. And there have been close interactions in academic and cultural sectors of both sides; retired officers of Taiwan military have, in particular, become important targets of Beijing’s “united front”. After Hau Pei-tsun, former Minister of National Defense ROC, visited his ancestral village ten-odd years ago, mainland China had sent out visit invitations heartily to many retired generals of Taiwan. This interaction on all front, from political, economic, to cultural and military sectors, does indeed have the effect of “boiling frogs”, numbing the Taiwanese vigilance against the powerful force of erosion that the authoritarian politics of mainland China has. Regarding the impacts “Red Penetration” might have on Taiwan’s democratic politics, Yuan Hongbing had made detailed analysis in his book Taiwan Disaster. In May last year I went to Taiwan, met with people from the Blue Camp, the Green Camp, Military and intellectuals, and listened to various viewpoints. In sum, when it comes to mainland China, the Taiwanese people are with mixed feelings: they could not reject the fetter of interests at present, and yet they are worried that over time Taiwan would lose its hard-won democracy. Regarding cross-strait relations, they wishfully hope that the status quo could be maintained in the long run—to work closely with mainland China on economy, and keep a distance in politics. This thinking is no difference from the mindset of “Relying on the Chinese dragon for economy, and counting on the American eagle for security” of Southeast Asian countries a few years back.
When in conversation with these Taiwanese, I always had this opinion: I sympathize with Hong Kong in its becoming more like mainland China, because the people there have nothing to rely on in resisting red penetration from the mainland; but if Taiwan ends up that way, then you could only blame yourselves for willingly become “boiling frogs”; you have a democratic system to rely on in resisting “mainlandization”. In recent years, some of those pursuing democracy in mainland China have been paying special attention to Taiwan, one of the key reasons for this was: with the establishment of democratic politics in the Island, the assumption that the quality of Chinese people are unfit for democracy was broken. They hoped that with the model of Taiwan, people in mainland China could get on the path of fighting against autocracy and establishing democratic politics.
In the 2012 election there is another thing worth mentioning: the change of attitude the Chinese people have toward the DPP. Contrary to how things were a few years back, the Chinese people have stopped lashing out whenever they hear the Green camp, quite a few wished that Tsai could win the election. Through observation and chatting on Weibo, I found that this change was not due to their understanding of Taiwan’s politics or of Kuomintang under Ma. This change of attitude was in fact a result of the following antagonistic mentality: the Communist Party opposes a candidate must be because that person is not conducive to its authoritarian rule, then that person has our support.
