The so-called Minsk Accords are being promoted – by French President Emmanuel Macron, among others – as the only viable solution to the crisis created by Russia’s military buildup along Ukraine’s borders. But they remain deeply unpopular in Ukraine and are little understood elsewhere.
There were in fact two major agreements negotiated in the Belarus capital, Minsk, the latest coming on February 12, 2015, after Russia’s occupation of Crimea and during a phase of intense fighting in the separatist-controlled Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.
The pact, intended to end the fighting and provide a political framework for the return of the separatist-held areas to Ukrainian sovereignty, was signed by representatives from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia, Ukraine and the Russian-backed leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR).
It did bring a fragile cease-fire, but seven years later, a new leadership in Kyiv argues that the fulfillment of all its terms is unpalatable and politically impossible.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, for his part, suggested this week that rejection of the accord is not an option. Using a Russian term that carries a degrading and sexist connotation during a press conference with Macron, he addressed Ukraine saying: “Like it or not, but you’ll have to deal with it, beauty.”
Appearing a day later alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv, Macron declared that the Minsk agreements are the only way to prevent a war in Ukraine and halt Russia’s military buildup.
Terms of the agreement
The 2015 negotiations were facilitated by then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel and then-French President François Hollande and came during a period of intense fighting between the Ukrainian forces and rebels supported by the Russian military at Debaltseve. The political document, called Minsk 2, was signed on February 12, 2015, by representatives from the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the DNR and LNR.
As a result of hasty drafting, Minsk 2 became a list of 13 steps, but Russia and Ukraine have never been able to agree upon the sequence in which they should be executed.
Although the pact was signed by Russia’s then-ambassador to Ukraine, Mikhail Zurabov, Russia does not see itself as a party to the agreement or obligated by its provisions. Moscow has also refused to amend the agreement and criticized Ukraine’s Western allies for failing to pressure Ukraine to fulfill its requirements.
The sides agreed to:
— An immediate and comprehensive cease-fire.
— Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides.
— Monitoring and verification of the cease-fire by the OSCE.
— Initiation of a dialogue on interim self-government for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in accordance with Ukrainian law, and acknowledgement of their special status by a resolution of parliament.
— A pardon and amnesty for people involved in the fighting.
— An exchange of hostages and prisoners.
— Provision of humanitarian assistance.
— Resumption of socioeconomic ties, including pensions.
— Restoration of full control of the state border by the government of Ukraine.
— Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment and mercenaries.
— Constitutional reform in Ukraine, including decentralization, with specific mention of Donetsk and Luhansk.
— Elections in Donetsk and Luhansk on terms to be agreed upon with their representatives.
— Intensification of the work of a Trilateral Contact Group, including representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE.
"I think it's fair to say, looking back, that many of those steps Ukraine has either implemented or begun to implement; there are some that haven't yet been tackled,” U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken told VOA during his last visit to Kyiv. “I think, unfortunately, it's equally fair to say that Russia has done virtually nothing in terms of the steps required in the Minsk agreement.”
Blinken put the onus on Moscow if there is to be progress on the agreement.
“Is Russia serious about implementing Minsk?” he asked. “If it is, we're prepared to facilitate that, we're prepared to support that, we're prepared to engage in that, but in support of this Normandy process that France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine are engaged in.”
Those four countries first met during D-Day anniversary celebrations in Normandy in 2014 and have remained in contact since then, seeking a resolution to the conflict in Ukraine. France and Germany were also instrumental in brokering the Minsk 2 agreement, which followed a string of Ukrainian government defeats in the east.
Ukrainian objections
But while many of Ukraine’s Western allies look to the Minsk agreements as a way out of the crisis, the deal is widely seen by the Ukrainian public as a betrayal of their national interests. Especially troublesome is the call for constitutional reform, which many believe would give the pro-Russian separatists a veto over foreign policy.
“It’s hard to call them agreements,” said Oleksiy Danilov, head of the National Security Council of Ukraine, in an interview with VOA. “When they were signed under the Russian gun barrel — and the Germans and the French watched — it was already clear for all rational people that it’s impossible to implement those documents.
“If the [Ukrainian] society doesn’t accept those agreements, it could lead to a very difficult internal situation and Russia counts on that. … If they insist on the fulfillment of the Minsk agreements as they are, it will be very dangerous for our country,” he said.
Danilov warned the West against pressuring Ukraine into fulfilling the Minsk deal, saying it would provoke dangerous instability, as happened in August 2015 when then-Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko proposed a draft law amending the constitution.
As the Ukrainian parliament debated the proposal, which omitted some of the most problematic provisions of the Minsk plan, rioting broke out nearby, leading to the deaths of four law enforcement officers.
Current President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was elected in 2019 after a campaign that called for ending the war in the east and making peace with Russia. As president, he pushed through a nationwide decentralization program that gave new powers to the Donbas but did not provide the rebel-held areas with the constitutional “special status” that the Minsk Accords had envisioned.
Renegotiations
Today, most Ukrainian experts and former officials believe the Minsk agreements must be renegotiated.
”The circumstances changed significantly, so the Minsk agreements are no longer the political decisions that can be used. They need to be totally renegotiated and maybe with a different group of negotiators,” said Valeriy Chaly, who was a member of the original Ukrainian delegation to Minsk.
”Russia did not fulfill its obligation in terms of security, quite the opposite,” he told VOA. “It threatens Ukraine with its forces and they release almost a million Russian passports to the citizens of occupied territory.”
The Minsk agreements, he continued, “are not leading to peace, unfortunately. Its time has passed, the circumstances changed. And Putin and [the] Kremlin changed them.”
Some information for this report came from Reuters.
