((PKG)) COVID-19 RESPONSE / EPIDEMIOLOGIST
((TRT: 05:24))
((Topic Banner: An Epidemiologist’s View of
COVID))
((Reporter/Camera/Producer: Igor Tsikhanenka))
((Camera: Henry Hernendez))
((Map: Washington DC))
((Main character: 1 male))
((NATS))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
So, the first big mistake was not really having a
surveillance system that allowed us to look for that
very early signature of spillover. Because if we
identified it then, when it was still inefficient, we could
have isolated, eliminated and essentially eradicated
this virus. Period. It never would have become a
source of community transmission.
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
So, allowing it to slowly sort of establish its efficiency
in human-to-human transmission over a period of time
really meant that in December, when it was finally
identified, it was a highly efficient human-to-human
transmission
((Photo Courtesy: AP))
and there was already widespread community
transmission within Wuhan.
((NATS))
((Photo Courtesy: AP))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
So, that’s the second mistake is that we did not then
turn that initial recognition in December, that we had
not only a highly efficient but a lethal virus, into a
coordinated global effort because once something
becomes that efficient, a respiratory virus begins
spreading that easily, borders are of no
consequences. It will spread as quickly as possible.
((NATS))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
In Asia, the Asian countries activated their plans and
they did a good job. So, you can see that in countries
like South Korea, in Taiwan, in Vietnam, in Thailand,
those three countries collectively have barely more
than a thousand deaths, but they have almost the
entire population of the United States. And that’s
because in January, they began activating their plans
((Photo Courtesy: AP))
that spoke to how do you manage the spread of a
respiratory virus. In Europe, in North America and the
United States, we didn’t. As a consequence, we are
paying that price now.
((NATS))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
I’d say we were a total failure. Look, we have 300,
more than 300,000 [currently 425,000] deaths in this
country. An equivalent-sized population is dealing
with a thousand deaths. That difference? This is not
a technologically constrained investment. If Vietnam
and Thailand can bring this virus under control, why
can’t the United States?
((NATS))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
This pandemic has evolved into, I might say, devolved
into an incredibly fractious political divide within the
United States. And it’s a political divide that says, this
is a myth or this is a reality.
((NATS))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
We need to acknowledge and recognize that there will
be another virus of this type, will emerge and
potentially have this kind of impact again. It’s not a
question of if. It is a question of when. But it is also
important to recognize that this is a pandemic that is
entirely preventable.
((NATS))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
The first step in moving the world towards being more
secure from a future COVID-19 event, is one, having really
our eyes on future threats while they are still circulating in
their natural habitat before they become a sort of a
community-level threat. So, we need a surveillance
system, a global surveillance system that is routinely
tracking and monitoring viruses, particularly high-risk
viruses.
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
The second is that the spillover itself is not a necessary
event. The spillover is a real consequence of how we
interact with the environment around us. And if, in these
hotspots, we pay closer attention to what are those risky
behaviors and practices that enable spillovers to happen,
we can better regulate and control those behaviors.
Humanity, as a group, tends not to be a quick learner. So,
I don’t know whether we’ve learned. You would have to
come back five years from now. Because right now,
everyone has heightened awareness about pandemics
and the threat of pandemics, but we also have a long
tradition of once a threat of this type disappears, we are
very eager to get back to business as usual.
((TRT: 05:24))
((Topic Banner: An Epidemiologist’s View of
COVID))
((Reporter/Camera/Producer: Igor Tsikhanenka))
((Camera: Henry Hernendez))
((Map: Washington DC))
((Main character: 1 male))
((NATS))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
So, the first big mistake was not really having a
surveillance system that allowed us to look for that
very early signature of spillover. Because if we
identified it then, when it was still inefficient, we could
have isolated, eliminated and essentially eradicated
this virus. Period. It never would have become a
source of community transmission.
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
So, allowing it to slowly sort of establish its efficiency
in human-to-human transmission over a period of time
really meant that in December, when it was finally
identified, it was a highly efficient human-to-human
transmission
((Photo Courtesy: AP))
and there was already widespread community
transmission within Wuhan.
((NATS))
((Photo Courtesy: AP))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
So, that’s the second mistake is that we did not then
turn that initial recognition in December, that we had
not only a highly efficient but a lethal virus, into a
coordinated global effort because once something
becomes that efficient, a respiratory virus begins
spreading that easily, borders are of no
consequences. It will spread as quickly as possible.
((NATS))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
In Asia, the Asian countries activated their plans and
they did a good job. So, you can see that in countries
like South Korea, in Taiwan, in Vietnam, in Thailand,
those three countries collectively have barely more
than a thousand deaths, but they have almost the
entire population of the United States. And that’s
because in January, they began activating their plans
((Photo Courtesy: AP))
that spoke to how do you manage the spread of a
respiratory virus. In Europe, in North America and the
United States, we didn’t. As a consequence, we are
paying that price now.
((NATS))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
I’d say we were a total failure. Look, we have 300,
more than 300,000 [currently 425,000] deaths in this
country. An equivalent-sized population is dealing
with a thousand deaths. That difference? This is not
a technologically constrained investment. If Vietnam
and Thailand can bring this virus under control, why
can’t the United States?
((NATS))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
This pandemic has evolved into, I might say, devolved
into an incredibly fractious political divide within the
United States. And it’s a political divide that says, this
is a myth or this is a reality.
((NATS))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
We need to acknowledge and recognize that there will
be another virus of this type, will emerge and
potentially have this kind of impact again. It’s not a
question of if. It is a question of when. But it is also
important to recognize that this is a pandemic that is
entirely preventable.
((NATS))
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
The first step in moving the world towards being more
secure from a future COVID-19 event, is one, having really
our eyes on future threats while they are still circulating in
their natural habitat before they become a sort of a
community-level threat. So, we need a surveillance
system, a global surveillance system that is routinely
tracking and monitoring viruses, particularly high-risk
viruses.
((Dennis Carroll, Chair, Global Virome Project,
Leadership Board))
The second is that the spillover itself is not a necessary
event. The spillover is a real consequence of how we
interact with the environment around us. And if, in these
hotspots, we pay closer attention to what are those risky
behaviors and practices that enable spillovers to happen,
we can better regulate and control those behaviors.
Humanity, as a group, tends not to be a quick learner. So,
I don’t know whether we’ve learned. You would have to
come back five years from now. Because right now,
everyone has heightened awareness about pandemics
and the threat of pandemics, but we also have a long
tradition of once a threat of this type disappears, we are
very eager to get back to business as usual.
