Khodorkovsky Q&A: Putin and 'Criminal Clique' Should be Investigated, Prosecuted
Danila Galperovich
Washington
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former Russian oil tycoon-turned-Kremlin foe who spent a decade in prison and now lives in exile, says Western powers have been slow to recognize the systemic criminality behind the wealth generated by Russian President Vladimir Putin's inner circle, and that criminal investigations, not international diplomacy and sanctions, are the best way to confront it.
Speaking with VOA's Russian Service shortly after a two-day human rights conference in Berlin that focused on the future of human rights and civil society during Putin's latest presidential term, the former head of Yukos discusses the Kremlin's reliance of artificially inflated oil prices, Western sanctions, and whether an international boycott of the upcoming 2018 FIFA World Cup, slated to kick off in Russia next month, is a politically smart idea.
Q: Your "Open Russia" foundation recently convened a conference in Berlin where people of very different backgrounds discussed the state of the opposition and human rights activism in today’s Russia. In your opinion, will it be possible for rights activists, the opposition, and civic bodies to survive during Putin’s new presidential term?
Khodorkovsky: No doubt, opposition as well as human rights activism will exist despite all obstacles. Unfortunately, the pressure exerted by Russian authorities on the protesters—and notice that I don’t even say “on the opposition”—leads to the fact that the protesters are marginalized, which we saw during protests of Putin's inauguration on May 5, and they also become more bitter.
But we also it before May 5. We saw it, for example, in Volokolamsk [a town some 170 km west of Moscow], where conflicts related to landfills and the mass poisoning kids are in full swing. The conflict started with basic municipal requests—people rallied and turned to the city administration, and they wanted to write complaints. But after all the pressure imposed on them, the situation became much more unpleasant, and then the shooting happened.
Q: There are several tactics: Some reformers aim to become municipal deputies, others protest on the street. What, in your opinion, is the most effective way of pushing the society toward change? I know that you somehow supported both activities, but if you had to choose?
Khodorkovsky: I believe that all forms of action are important. Street protests are undoubtedly important, since the authorities react to them more sharply, and reacting this way can force authorities to make mistakes and, as a result, moves toward its inevitable end more quickly. On the other hand, its end will arrive one way or another. Only Putin himself believes he will live forever. The question is, what will happen after? This "after" will come relatively soon—maybe in six years, maybe in 10 years, but unlikely more than that. And judging by how things are now, most Russians will want a "new Putin" in the place of the "old Putin." It will be an attempt to find a new kind of tsar, but it won’t lead to anything. In the meantime, it is very important to change Russian society's approach to fomenting change, and convince people that it is necessary to change the system, not merely individual people. That’s the role of municipal elections and support of the society’s civil activity.
Q: You have touched upon one of the most important topics: Putinism, a system that has crystallized over the past 18 years. And you, like no other, know very well that people closest to Putin have become quite autonomous actors in this system. To what degree is the system itself autonomous of Putin? Depending on any variety of outcomes, what, in your opinion, is the likelihood that this system be able to maintain the same level of repression, exclusion and aggression?
Khodorkovsky: I don't really believe it's possible to reproduce this system unless there are serious changes. The role that Putin has chosen for himself since his time as mayor of St. Petersburg is the role of a criminal community arbitrator. He has been playing this role up to this day. So, he can still ensure his own security after stepping down—although that may now be slightly tougher after events in eastern Ukraine—but he cannot ensure the safety of those close to him, because he exists as a political actor who creates conflict within his inner circle. And the second he leaves, forfeiting his role as arbiter of this criminal group, its members will start fighting each other. Some of its members will certainly suffer. What will we get as a result? Maybe a person who would rely on civil society and allow a more or less peaceful transition to a more democratic system? Perhaps a more institutionalized form of government? Or maybe it will be someone who will try to rely on the security services of Putin's entourage. Then we'll get a military junta, and the system will collapse and it won’t be peaceful. Unfortunately, we're not yet at a point where anyone can predict that.
Q: We know about the repression of Open Russia's own members in Russia itself. How will the organization operate now that Putin’s new presidential term just started? There are signs, after all, that the state pressure is unlikely to weaken.
Khodorkovsky: But the sheer number of people willing to participate in the work of "Open Russia" isn't decreasing. More people come, new regional branches open. People understand that they are going against the authorities, and they are ready for this conflict. We saw the same thing in the headquarters of Alexei Navalny. To be honest, these are the same members of Open Russia who used to work at the headquarters of Navalny and Sobchak. We try to find legal methods of resolving conflicts, and helping civil society, at times going against laws because the current laws make everything illegal. But at least within the law, according to the Constitution, we try to resolve these conflicts. But the fact that the authorities are tightening the screws can lead to people’s frustration will turn into more radical actions.
Q: You're an oil expert, an economist. Do you think Russia's rising oil prices can offset Western sanctions or make them tolerable for Moscow?
Khodorkovsky: Look, we see today that the growth [of oil prices] is wasted effort, meaning the economy isn't really buoyed by a hike in oil and gas prices. And it’s clear why. The country's system of governance is destroyed. It disintegrates more each year and, as a result, the ability to leverage the revenue is constantly diminishing. The country had reserves, but the money wasn't utilized as, say, foreign direct investment, and it didn't get invested back into state enterprises or commerce. In order to use money effectively, rather than steal it, you need to have a structure of institutions that would allow businesses to develop. Russia does not have such a structure.
As for Western sanctions, I can only say that those viewed as anti-Russian were mostly neutralized by the West's inability to refuse Russian oil and gas. But sanctions that specifically target members of the Kremlin criminal clique are definitely an irritant that has support—even if it’s tacit or cautiously skeptical support—within Russian society at large. That said, it's important to understand that we're not dealing with an ordinary government or ordinary politicians whom, even if a bit authoritarian in nature, are easily affected by regular sanctions. We are dealing with a criminal clique that acts like a criminal clique, and sanctions have a different effect on them. If, for example, you and I have our bank accounts frozen, we simply won’t know how to get money. But any drug dealer in the street knows far too well how to live without a bank account. Same goes for the Kremlin.
Q: What leverage does the international community still have over the Kremlin?
Khodorkovsky: I still believe that the Western community has not yet realized that it is dealing not just with an authoritarian government—it is dealing with a criminal clique. Therefore, the struggle against this group, the efforts to stop it from destroying unity in Europe, destroying Euro-Atlantic unity, provoking conflict within Western countries, cannot be limited to diplomatic or military means. It should be led with police methods, methods of police investigations. When will the West realize that it is necessary to conduct an investigation against Putin and his entourage, against the people who help them in return for money or spoils, or because they are blackmailed? These people should be identified, it should be clear whether or not they break laws. And if they do, they should be prosecuted and their names should be made public. This is the best and most effective means of confrontation.
Q: And by "police" you mean criminal prosecution?
Khodorkovsky: I mean first investigations of suspicious or corrupt activities, of suspicions of abuse—the same investigations that exist in just about every country. I'm talking about acknowledging that these people are a criminal clique—a few dozen key people. And if their crimes are confirmed, then, naturally, the investigation should turn into criminal prosecution.
Q: You called Alexei Navalny your ally during a number of electoral and public campaigns. Does he remain your ally?
Khodorkovsky: Undoubtedly. I think that Navalny is a bright person, a bright politician. We have certain strategic differences. I support a parliamentary republic and believe there should be more independent opposition forces, which should function as coalitions. Alexei is much more skeptical of coalitions and mostly tries to cast himself as a direct antagonist to Putin. At this stage, however, we are definitely allies.
Q: Do you think the coming years of Putin's rule portend a further awakening of imperial instincts, or will Russian society have a revelatory awakening of its own and come to understand that this path leads nowhere? That isolation increasing and something needs to be done?
Khodorkovsky: We already see that disappointment is there. The Kerch Strait Bridge to Crimea and the memories of 2014 annexation force many people to ask themselves: "What have I gained from this in all these years?" Or "what have I lost? What has my family lost?" I believe Russian society is mature enough to avoid going to extremes. For example, I can say that extreme nationalism and chauvinism won't take hold in Russia. There are certain groups, but they don't get much support, just like they don’t get much support in Europe. There is a certain niche, but it doesn’t grow. I'm more like an optimist in this respect.
Q: Is there something important that you would like to say, that I did not ask you?
Khodorkovsky: I would like to say a few words about the 2018 FIFA World Cup that's about to take place in Russia. This issue has obviously caused a serious split, both inside Russian society and in the West. There are thoughts about boycotting it, and thoughts about just turning a blind eye to everything happening in Russia during the event. But I think that boycotting the championship would be a big mistake if you think about teams going to Russia, and people and fans visiting the country. Because the championship is a way to show everyday Russians that Russia is not surrounded by enemies, and that the Kremlin has largely invented them. On the other hand, I do believe Western leaders would be making a mistake if they were to visit the man who has created a fully authoritarian regime and has surrounded himself with a criminal clique. This would be a mistake, because it would be seen as encouragement, and Putin should not be encouraged. Therefore, there should be a very clear stance: "Yes, we are visiting the Russian society, but we are not visiting the Kremlin criminal clique."
This story originated in VOA's Russian Service.